McDonald v. R. – TCC: Transfers to spouse who knew of “issues” with CRA gave rise to section 160 liability

Bill Innes on Current Tax Cases

http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/108834/index.do New Window

McDonald v. The Queen (March 30, 2015 – 2015 TCC 73, Rip J.).

Précis: In 2004 Douglas Chapman transferred roughly $30,000 to his spouse, Caroline M. McDonald, at a time when he owed in excess of $72,000 in income tax arrears. Ms. McDonald was assessed under subsection 160(1) of the Income Tax Act as a result of the funds transferred to her by Mr. Chapman. Mr. Chapman died in 2011. Counsel for Ms. McDonald argued that she was not well aware of his collection problems with CRA and did not act to thwart collection by CRA. Justice Rip found that she was aware of his “issues” with CRA and helped him hide the funds. It did not assist her that she held the funds for him as an agent or trustee. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Decision: Ms. McDonald’s spouse transferred funds to her in 2004 at a time when he had income tax arrears:

[1] This is an appeal by Ms. Caroline M. McDonald against an assessment pursuant to subsection 160(1) of the Income Tax Act (“Act”) for tax in the amount of $30,235.68 which was transferred to her by Mr. Douglas Chapman in 2004, at the time his liability under the Act was not less than $72,425.62.

[2] Mr. Chapman, who died in 2011, was assessed income tax for 1999, 2000 and 2001 by notices of assessment dated April 7, 2005 and for 2002 on November 1st, 2004.

In essence her counsel argued that she did not conspire with Mr. Chapman to defeat CRA’s collection activities:

[19] This is the position of the appellant: that she did nothing to thwart the ability of the CRA to collect on Mr. Chapman’s debt to it.

[20] In the case at bar, appellant’s counsel argued that unlike Ms. Livingston, his client was not well aware of Mr. Chapman’s collection problem. In his view this was a significant difference in the two appeals.

The Court rejected her reliance upon two Quebec decision based on the concept of “mandate”:

[24] Unfortunately, the concept of mandate is not part of the common law, the law of British Columbia. In a contract of mandate there is no divestment of ownership of property. Noлl J.A. reviewed the civil and common law concepts of ownership at paragraphs 42 to 49 inclusive of 9101. These cases are of no help to the appellant, a resident of British Columbia.

Ms. McDonald was well aware of Mr. Chapman’s “issues” with CRA:

[28] Ms. McDonald knew full well that Mr. Chapman had “issues” with the CRA and cooperated with him to assist him to hide his funds from the CRA by opening a bank account in her name to hold the money. As owner of the bank account, she controlled what went into the account and what went out. That she may have held the funds in trust for Mr. Chapman does not assist her: subsection 160(1) is rather specific on this point. Whether she held the funds as agent of Mr. Chapman was not pleaded and therefore, not part of the evidence. At times the funds were transferred to Ms. McDonald, Mr. Chapman was liable under the Act for tax. He endorsed various cheques and gave them to Ms. McDonald for deposit in her account. She and Mr. Chapman were common law partners at the time of the transfers, she was not blind to Mr. Chapman’s “issues” with the fisc and Ms. McDonald gave no consideration to Mr. Chapman for the funds.

Accordingly the appeal was dismissed with costs.